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Abstract 
In the past decade humanitarian crises have been occurring with increasing frequency. As of 2013 
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) is involved 
in 27 countries, monitoring the response to natural disasters or violent conflict (Where we work 
n.d.). Over the same period the internet has seen a deluge of new, interactive website and tools. 
Social media sites that allow users to share their own content with a digital community have led 
to an explosion of user-generated content online. Meanwhile, internet-based mapping tools, such 
as Google Maps, make it easy for almost anyone to make maps online. These developments 
converge in the form of a recent trend: volunteer crisis mapping. Since 2008 individuals have 
started making maps and collecting spatial data related to humanitarian crises –both violent 
conflicts and natural disasters. While the role of social media and web-mapping in humanitarian 
responses has been praised for creating a participatory space in humanitarian responses, the 
people volunteering to do the crisis mapping remain largely unexplored. Drawing from the 
neogeography literature which explores the impact amateur mappers in general, this paper seeks 
to define who the volunteer crisis mappers are, and how they are forming institutional 
connections to the ‘formal’ humanitarian sector. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2010, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 struck Haiti. Foreign governments, 
international humanitarian agencies, NGOs, and foreign governments, rushed to aid the Haitian 
government and local people, but to do their work, even to get started, these actors needed 
information – maps of the affected areas, assessments of building damage, and names of missing 
people. Yet, comprehensive maps and many other records did not exist or were lost in the 
wreckage. In addition, the local government was incapable of managing the relief efforts due to 
weak leadership, disorganization and the physical loss of most of the infrastructure in the capital. 
In the words of one UN spokeswoman, it was “a logistical nightmare” ('Logistical nightmare' to 
get help to victims 2010). Out of this chaos two independent, volunteer-led responses emerged to 
fill the spatial information gaps: Humanitarian OpenStreetMap (HOT) and the Ushahidi Haiti 
Project.  
OpenStreetMap (OSM) is an open-source, online mapping platform that allows volunteers to 
upload GPS data and trace elements from satellite images to contribute to a crowdsourced online 
map of the world (like a combination of Wikipedia and Google Maps). The Humanitarian 
OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) is an off-shoot volunteer organization that applies the OSM 
platform to improve map data for humanitarian situations. In Haiti, HOT remote volunteers took 
high resolution satellite images of the damage and traced over roads and buildings to create a 
detailed, up to date map for humanitarian responders (Zook, et al. 2010). Figure 1 shows the 
incredible amount of detail added to the OSM map of Port-au-Prince, Haiti by the HOT 
volunteers (Maron 2010).  
    
Figure 1 OSM Haiti Before (left) & After (right) HOT Mapping 
Ushahidi is an online crowdsourced mapping platform that allows many people to submit reports 
via SMS or email. Once the information is verified, categorized, and geotagged, it is added to an 
online map. The Ushahidi Haiti project was started by a group of graduate students at Tufts 
University, organized by Patrick Meier, then the Director of Crisis Mapping at Ushahidi and also a 
Ph.D. student at the Fletcher School at Tufts. The team of students used the Ushahidi platform to 
map information coming from affected communities in Haiti via social media. The result was a 
simple, interactive web map that showed nearly real-time visualizations of calls for assistance in 
Haiti (Morrow, et al. 2011).  
Introduction 
9 
 
These projects are two examples of volunteer crisis mapping, a phenomenon driven by recent 
technological advances, online communities and volunteerism. They are notable for several 
factors: they were organized and fueled by volunteers using an open, collaborative production 
model; they provided information that was not otherwise available to humanitarian actors in a 
very short period of time; and they applied very recent developments in online mapping 
technologies.  
 
The world of crisis mapping is quite diverse – encompassing professional crisis mappers (such as 
the United Nations’ Operations Satellite Applications Programme, UNOSAT, which uses satellite 
imagery to monitor humanitarian crises), academic crisis mappers (like the researchers at the 
Peace Research Institute Oslo who study conflicts using geospatial datasets), and volunteer crisis 
mappers (both organized and ad-hoc). This paper will focus on organized volunteer crisis 
mappers because their growth has been the most notable and their institutional role in 
humanitarian response is still evolving. These volunteers have created a new space in the 
relatively closed and specialized field of humanitarian response work. In a way, the volunteers are 
an ‘informal’ humanitarian work force as compared to the ‘formal’ humanitarian actors like the 
United Nations, the Red Cross, and other NGOs.  
The innovation of volunteer crisis mapping projects is indisputable, but their impact is more 
difficult to define. In the two examples above, both were data collection missions yet they were 
not initiated by any of the ‘formal’ humanitarian actors present in Haiti (like the UN, the Red 
Cross, USAID, etc.).  So, the actors in the field whom these projects intended to help were not 
immediately aware of these new information sources. Furthermore, when they did become aware 
of them, humanitarian actors did not know if they could trust these new information sources 
because they were produced by remote volunteers, a new and unknown labor source (Morrow, et 
al. 2011). Additionally, the local population engaged by these projects expected a response in 
return for their participation, but responses were rare and inconsistent due to the lack of project 
ownership among actors on the ground (Morrow, et al. 2011). Thus, the impact of such projects is 
dependent on the institutional connections and personal credibility of volunteer crisis mappers.   
In order to assess the impact of this new trend of crisis mapping, this paper will explore these two 
criteria 0 the institutional linkages and credibility – of organized volunteer crisis mappers. First it 
will look at the development of linkages between the ‘formal’ humanitarian actors and volunteer 
crisis mappers, by looking at several crises in the past decade. Then it will look at the volunteer 
themselves and attempt to answer some questions relevant to their credibility as sources, namely 
their professional experience, motivation, and possible biases. Finally, it will analyze the volunteer 
crisis mapping organization, an important unit of analysis that has been previously overlooked in 
the literature, and assess how these organizations affect both the credibility of their volunteers 
and the institutional linkages with ‘formal’ actors.   
According to CrisisMappers.net, the online portal for the crisis mapping community:  
Crisis mappers leverage mobile & web-based applications, participatory maps & crowdsourced 
event data, aerial & satellite imagery, geospatial platforms, advanced visualization, live 
simulation, and computational & statistical models to power effective early warning for rapid 
response to complex humanitarian emergencies. As information scientists we also attempt to 
extract meaning from mass volumes of real-time data exhaust. (Crisis Mappers 2013) 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Crisis mapping is celebrated for engaging new players, particularly the public, and collecting and 
producing new kinds of data. However, these contributions are not unique to crisis mapping. 
Digital mapping technologies have been used as a form of public engagement since the mid-
1990’s. Similarly, the challenges of data collection, analysis and management in humanitarian 
situations are not new or unique to the work of volunteer crisis mappers. This chapter will 
summarize the findings from the literature of these two existing fields and draw out the themes 
that will be useful in analyzing the volunteer crisis mappers and their institutional connections to 
humanitarian actors.   
The Evolution of Engagement: From PPGIS to Neogeography 
New technologies – be they GIS or webmapping – can offer a seemingly new approach to engaging 
communities in decision making. However, certain challenges to truly inclusive engagement are a 
recurring. In addition, if the new technologies and their sources do not have credibility in the eyes 
of decision makers, then the “engagement” has little effect on the actual decision making.  
PPGIS 
The idea of using digital mapping to engage average citizens was first put forward in the public 
participation GIS (PPGIS) literature in the 1990’s in response to the critiques of the GIS and 
Society literature. The GIS and Society literature argued that maps and GIS were instruments of 
“power-knowledge” that maintained and at times exacerbated existing political, social and 
cultural power imbalances (Crampton 2001). In response, GIScientists and practitioners worked to 
prove that GIS did not need to be a positivist tool of “top down” planning and monitoring. They 
presented GIS as a tool to leverage citizen participation in policymaking and empower 
marginalized groups by giving them the same tools of knowledge production. Approaches varied 
from those that focused on creating an inclusive process with more effort at engaging 
stakeholders and making the technology approachable (Sieber 2006), to those that dealt with 
changing the software itself to make it more inclusive to qualitative forms of data (Kwan 2002). 
However, despite innovative applications of GIS software and partnerships with local 
communities and grassroots NGOs, barriers persisted. The digital divide prevented the poorest 
members of society from accessing these tools of engagement, and powerful groups were able to 
coopt participatory processes to their advantage (Elwood 2006).  
Web 2.0 
In the early of the 21st century several technological advances seemed to present a solution to the 
challenges PPGIS faced. Called Web 2.0, these technologies include interactive websites and 
digital platforms like social media sites (facebook, Twitter, Flickr), user-generated web content 
(blogs, wikis, etc.), collaborative suites (Google Documents), and crowdsourced resources 
(Wikipedia, Yelp). Web 2.0 technologies blurred the line between the user and the producer of 
digital information, creating the user-producer by empowering participants with the tools to 
create their own data (O'Reilly 2005). The user-producer model presented a demand-driven 
participation model – if people were interested they would participate (Flanagin and Metzger 
2008). However, the previous concerns of PPGIS, the digital divide and cooptation by more 
powerful groups, persisted. Even when the tools are provided there is a skills gap that 
disadvantages those with the least exposure and access to technology (Johnson and Sieber 2012).  
Literature Review 
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Nevertheless, many government agencies and other public organizations tasked with community 
engagement have turned to various forms of Web 2.0 to meet their participatory goals, spawning 
the term Gov 2.0 (Johnson and Sieber 2012). On the positive side, Gov 2.0 poses the possibility of 
financial savings, efficiency and – seemingly – government transparency. Rather than simply 
exposing government operations through open data, feedback systems create the sense of being 
heard. However, when feedback mechanisms are not attached to a means for action, this feeling 
of being heard is meaningless. Gov 2.0 can look like government accountability, but if there is 
little internal impetus to truly respond to or act on comments from the citizenry, the relationship 
becomes one-way (Elwood 2007). 
Thus, Web 2.0 technologies created a user-producer with a more active role in the creation and 
use of online content, but, without true buy-in from the existing institutions these new 
technologies recreate the old pitfalls of participation. 
Volunteered Geographic Information 
Much of the user-generated content produced by Web 2.0 technologies contains geographic data. 
Michael Goodchild coined the term volunteered geographic information (VGI) to describe user-
generated online content that contains geographic information (Goodchild 2009). Examples of 
VGI include tweets (using Twitter), facebook posts, and images uploaded to Flickr. Although VIG 
presents rich, large datasets, it also raises several concerns about the reliability of the data, and 
the privacy and consent of the authors (Flanagin and Metzger 2008). Data reliability is impacted 
by the sheer size of data and the fact that it is coming from so many sources at once. With so 
many separate authors it is more difficult to find false reports. Crowdsourced projects like 
Wikipedia have shown that typically the false reports or errors are grossly outweighed by the 
accurate information to the extent that the dataset as a whole is not corrupted. However, the 
effective anonymity of the crowd can create an opening for malicious intentions (Friedland 2010), 
as in Syria where an oppressive government used the anonymity of a social media platform 
(Twitter) to present incorrect information to incite violence or other destructive behavior 
(Perlroth 2013).  
Although, by definition, VGI is “volunteered” it still raises concerns about the informed consent of 
the author. It could be argued that users creating content are not giving informed consent to have 
their data mined because they do not know or understand all of the uses for which such data 
could be used (Elwood 2007). In particular, users may not even realize that their data has a 
geographic component, since it is often not the primary purpose (Flanagin and Metzger 2008). 
Privacy is another similar concern. Again, users of public sites, like facebook, may not realize how 
accessible all of their information is. And, because social media accounts are linked to personal 
information it is possible to trace them back to individuals. Breaching privacy is a problem for 
research ethics, but it can also put subjects at risk. In several cases, user information from 
facebook and Twitter has been used by repressive regimes to track down political dissidents. 
Spatializing data can also lead to other kinds of invasions of privacy. Releasing the locations of 
humanitarian actors on the ground can put them in danger. For example, Al Qaeda forces 
attacked a Red Cross station in Pakistan during relief efforts from the floods in 2005 (Reidenberg 
2013).   
Finally, as with any other technologically based information, VGI is biased towards those who 
have access to the internet, devices to access the internet, and to a lesser degree, those who speak 
English or another globally dominant language (Goodchild 2007) (Zook and Graham 2007). So, 
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when using VGI one must remember that it is not descriptive of everyone, just everyone able to 
contribute data.  
Neogeography 
In 2005, the release of Google’s application programming interface (API) transformed online 
mapping capabilities by making the base data available to anyone with basic programming skills. 
With the API, Google maps could be easily embedded into other websites or added as a base to 
other layers of information. Similarly, advances in open-source technology made customizable 
mapping products accessible and free. One such example, OpenStreetMap (OSM) is an open-
source online mapping tool that makes free online maps available and is maintained by users 
(similar to Wikipedia). Another example is Quantum GIS, a free, open source version of ArcMap 
(a GIS program). By lowering the financial and technical barriers, these developments enabled 
almost anyone with an internet connection to make and share maps, and by extension giving 
reason for a new field in geography to focus on all of the new, map makers: neogeography. 
Professional geographers are trained to maintain certain practices and standards of data – 
including protecting the privacy and anonymity of sources. However, these new technologies 
make it possible for nearly anyone to make a map, and the neogeography literature assumes that 
“anyone” is an amateur (Goodchild 2007), and thus lacking the knowledge of these standards and 
good practices. As Goodchild (2009) explains, “Terms such as professional convey an immediate 
sense of care, attention to detail and adherence to rigorously applied standards, whereas the very 
term amateur suggests poor quality and is even used pejoratively.” Flanagin and Metzger (2008) 
go farther, posing the possibility that these people providing geographic data “are not trained or 
even necessarily interested in geography as a science” (emphasis added).  
The Role of Data in Humanitarian Response 
There are several characteristics that make humanitarian crises, both natural disasters and violent 
conflicts, uniquely challenging situations. They result in large numbers of displaced or missing 
people that need at least food, water, shelter, and medical care. Existing infrastructure such as 
roads, electricity, water pipes, telecommunications and internet infrastructure are often damaged 
and temporarily out of order, if not destroyed. The response to such crises happens as quickly as 
possible, with many actors from international agencies (the UN), NGOs (the Red Cross), foreign 
governmental agencies (USAID), private companies, and the general public stepping in to do 
what they can. Because of these challenges, the seemingly simple tasks of coordinating activities 
and using and sharing data become complex and require (at least until the advent of volunteer 
crisis mappers) expert handling.  
Coordination of Actors and Data Sources 
Humanitarian crises are chaotic, in part because of all of the actors who get involved in the 
response. In a humanitarian situation there are six categories of actors who could become 
involved. On the local level there is the local government, local NGOs, and the local affected 
population. From the international scale, come the international NGOs, such as the International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Crecent (IFRC); bodies of the UN, such as UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), UNICEF, and the World Food Programme 
(WFP); and humanitarian arms of foreign governments which are often supported by their own 
military, like USAID and AusAID (Australia).  
Coordinating response work between all of these groups is difficult because although they are 
united in responding to a crisis, they have different mandates and funding sources which translate 
Literature Review 
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into different priorities (Laituri and Kodrich 2005). To deal with this, UN OCHA acts as the 
coordinator for all the other actors. The cluster system, a management framework put in place by 
OCHA to organize actors (including UN bodies) by their area of focus (food, shelter, logistics, 
etc.) in a particular crisis, organizes which groups are responsible for certain tasks in the response 
effort. Also, ReliefWeb, an online clearinghouse managed by the UN makes available information 
related to ongoing humanitarian missions, collects all of the data that different actors are 
producing as they work and makes it available to all actors (UN OCHA 2012). 
Like the range of actors, information during a crisis comes from multiple sources. There are three 
basic types of information needed. Baseline data establishes the ‘before’ situation, which includes 
existing infrastructure, population data, land cover and satellite images. Rapid assessment data is 
collected in the immediate aftermath from field surveys and includes information such as the 
numbers and locations of displaced people, damage to buildings and infrastructure, and public 
health indicators. Remote sensing, such as satellite imagery or light detection and ranging 
(LIDAR) imagery, can also track the ‘after’ using high resolution satellite images to detect 
damage.  
Depending on the situation this data can come from different actors. For example, if the local 
government is not greatly incapacitated by the disaster it may be able to supply most of the 
existing data. Or, if there is already a presence of international NGOs or the UN they will already 
have a lot of the existing data. These actors that are already in the field are well positioned to do 
the rapid assessment after the crisis hits, but they are also susceptible to being impacted by the 
crisis and thus incapacitated. For example, when the earthquake struck Haiti, it destroyed much 
of the UN’s base. So, instead of being able to deliver baseline data and help setup the rapid 
response, the UN workers already in Haiti were just as incapacitated as the local government. In 
these cases, the rapid assessment is delayed while new teams arrive and get into place. Private 
companies can also be useful partners for gathering data during a crisis. Under the International 
Charter on Space and Major Disasters all signatories, which include private satellite companies 
and national space missions of many countries, must release relevant images after a crisis, so 
often there is a lot of imagery available (International Charter on Space and Major Disasters 2013). 
For new actors, understanding this landscape of actors is the first challenge to participating in 
humanitarian response work. The next step is getting space in the chain of information collection 
and analysis. The next chapter looks specifically at how volunteer crisis mapping projects have 
slowly made a place for themselves on the inside of this closed-circle of information production.  
Data Management & Decision Making 
With all of these actors working together and separately, a lot of information is collected in a 
short amount of time, leading to challenges in the application and management of data. In a 
recent study, “The Use of Evidence in Humanitarian Decision Making,” Darcy et al (2013) find that 
not all data is necessarily used for making decisions. Humanitarian workers often refer to “data 
overload” when they have more data than they have time to process. So, for the sake of 
expediency, organizations can become “path dependent” in their use of data in decision making. 
In other words, actors find it easier to make decisions based on the traditional data they are able 
to collect, rather than incorporating data from new sources or other organizations. Similarly, 
actors will often settle for “good enough” data because of the high stakes and short timeframe for 
making decisions. Effectively, they decide that the human cost of taking more time to be more 
accurate or correct would be higher than the cost of using the data at the “good enough” stage 
(Darcy, et al. 2013) (Zook, et al. 2010).  
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New data sources and formats can further complicate this situation. Institutional preference or 
partnerships may require the use of a particular format or platform that is incompatible with 
others. For example, in Haiti, some field workers started using Google Maps to keep track of 
conditions such as road closures. This information would have been useful merged with the 
OpenStreetMap map of Haiti, but because Google is proprietary software and OSM is open-
source, the two datasets were incompatible (Zook, et al. 2010). Thus, getting new kinds of data to 
actors in a way that they will actually use it is an uphill battle, even form within the institutional 
setting.  
Crisis mapping volunteers pose a unique challenge because they are – at least in concept – 
amateur mappers, as described in the neogeography literature, but they are also the actors 
making the most use of the latest kinds of tools and data in a humanitarian application. Thus, 
they are the neo-humanitarians – a new, web-enabled work force that operates outside of the 
professional, ‘formal’ sector.  
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF LINKAGES WITH 
THE ‘FORMAL’ HUMANITARIAN SECTOR 
The 2010 earthquake in Haiti was a watershed moment for the development of volunteer crisis-
mapping efforts. However to understand the complete transformation that is taking place 
between these organized volunteers and the ‘formal’ humanitarian sector, it is necessary to start 
before Haiti. This section will analyze the humanitarian responses to several humanitarian crises 
to illustrate the shift towards more formally incorporating volunteer crisis mappers. 
Early Applications: Local volunteers and an engaged digital public 
Before Twitter, facebook, and Google Maps, mapping and geospatial technology still played a key 
role in crisis responses. Without the Web 2.0 platforms to make volunteering accessible to anyone 
with an internet connection, individuals volunteered in any way they could, whether donating 
their time and skills in person, or giving financial support remotely.  
September 11 (2001) 
After the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, on September 11, 2001, nearby data 
and mapping experts sprang into action to help the response teams make sense of what had 
happened. Because this was one of the first times that GIS and remote sensing data had been used 
for such a situation, there was no protocol. So, instead ad-hoc groups organized themselves based 
on experience and access to data. GIS professionals worked as volunteers out of the designated 
Emergency Mapping and Data Center at Pier 92 (Kawasaki, Berman and Guan 2013).  
The South Asian Tsunami (2004) 
On December 26, 2004, an offshore earthquake caused a gigantic tsunami in the Indian Ocean. 22 
countries were hit and the death toll was estimated at more than 200,000 people (Underwood 
2010). The relief effort was led by the UN, and several of the affected countries and the U.S. 
(Margesson 2005). With such a geographically large scope of damage satellite imagery proved 
essential to the response. High-resolution images showing the affected areas before and after the 
tsunami were donated by private satellites and software companies (Laituri and Kodrich 2005).  
From the perspective of the global public, media coverage garnered a lot of attention that resulted 
in this being one of the first disasters that raised a significant amount of financial contributions 
through online pledges (Laituri and Kodrich 2005).  
The Transition: Ad hoc volunteer web-mapping of disaster affected populations 
With the arrival of Google Maps in 2005, online mapping capabilities dramatically shifted, making 
space for ad hoc volunteer mapping efforts.  
Hurricane Katrina (2005) 
When Hurricane Katrina hit southern Louisiana and Mississippi, it flooded roads and buildings, 
leaving many people stranded, often without enough food and water and limited communications 
access. The perceived failure of the FEMA response to meet these dispersed needs quickly, caused 
many individuals to take up the response effort themselves, via the internet. They created 
websites with message boards for missing people to connect with concerned families and friends, 
lists of active relief centers and supplies that they needed, and maps – maps of people, damaged 
infrastructure, and the relief effort (Laituri and Kodrich 2005). Scipionus.com was a Google map 
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that showed missing people, damaged buildings, and floodlines. It was set up by two software 
engineers, but the information was added in a crowdsourced manner with anyone able to add to 
the map (Laituri and Kodrich 2005) (Roche, Propeck-Zimmermann and Mericskay 2013). Google 
Earth also updated its imagery with images showing the damage from the storm (Kawasaki, 
Berman and Guan 2013). And, the newly formed GIS Corps sent volunteer GIS professionals to 
assist on-site with geospatial needs of responders.   
Haitian Earthquake (2010) 
Haiti was a different story. Google Maps and Google Earth were popular and well known by 2010. 
Mashups using Google Maps and other data (like Scipionus.com) were by now a familiar concept. 
Ushahidi, the SMS-based crowdsourcing map platform, had presented another version of a web-
map, significant in its simplicity and efficacy in tracking election violence in Kenya in 2008. So, 
this was the turning point for both the involvement of the digital public and the role of the local 
voices. Thus it is not a surprise that these technologies pioneered in earlier crises were quickly 
deployed when traditional means of collecting and managing data could not keep up with the 
needs of the ground relief efforts in Haiti.  
The Humanitarian OpenStreetMap team (HOT) and the Ushahidi Haiti projects, were just two of 
many responses to the need for geospatial data. The Harvard University’s Center for Geographic 
Analysis uploaded high resolution satellite images formatted for immediate printing to resolve the 
lack of paper maps on the ground in Haiti (Kawasaki, Berman and Guan 2013). CrisisCamps, 
meetings of members of CrisisCommons, a network of NGOs, individuals, private companies and 
government agencies united around providing better technology for disaster responses, sprung up 
all over the U.S. and eventually across the world. The purpose of these meetings was to create 
better tools for geographic data collection and analysis to be used on the ground in Haiti (Zook, et 
al. 2010). Finally, a partnership between a Haitian mobile phone provider and several NGOs 
resulted in a “shortcode” to which people in Haiti could text reports of need (Clemenzo 2011).  
However, despite the deluge of good intentions, Haiti was also a prime example of “data 
overload.” With so many unconventional actors getting involved in the processes of collecting, 
producing, and analyzing data actors on the ground in Haiti were challenged to know where to 
start (Nelson, Sigal and Zambrano 2010). As mentioned earlier, one of the problems with this lack 
of coordination was incompatible platforms that could not be combined. Another was the lack of 
a consistent response mechanism for engaged local communities. In the case of the shortcode 
project, these reports were added to the Ushahidi Haiti map, but with so many involved partners 
there was no one directly responsible for responding to these reports. So, while local people 
expected immediate action to come from their reports, most of the data was just used to help 
target concentrations of need or triangulate other data sources (Clemenzo 2011) (Morrow, et al. 
2011).  
Today: An integrated role for volunteer crisis mappers 
In response to the lessons learned in Haiti, several shifts to the crisis mapping environment are 
visible. Most evident is the creation of the Standby Task Force (SBTF) in late 2010. Also, the UN’s 
immediate partnership with the SBTF to do a training on Ushahidi deployment in an emergency 
situation indicates the UN’s recognition of an important emergent technology (Meier 2011). 
Finally, the creation of the Digital Humanitarian Network (DHN), a network of volunteer crisis 
mapping organizations and other volunteer and technical communities, in the Fall of 2012, 
indicates a more permanent shift towards making a unified place for these volunteers in the 
‘formal’ humanitarian response environment.  
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The Philippines’ Typhoon Pablo (2012) 
Within a day of Typhoon Pablo hitting the Philippines (on December 3rd, 2012), UN OCHA 
reached out to the Digital Humanitarian Network for support. The UN wanted to analyze the past 
three days of Twitter activity in the Philippines as one means of assessing the damage from the 
storm. Two volunteer crisis mapping organizations responded to the mission – the Standby Task 
Force and Humanity Road. Within 12 hours the two groups had jointly completed the task, 
producing a spatial dataset with 138 “highly annotated” data points (Meier 2012). UN OCHA used 
the dataset to create a map of conditions immediately following the storm (see Figure 2). This 
map was shared internally at UN OCHA, as well as with other humanitarian actors and the 
government of the Philippines.1 
 
Figure 2 "Philippines - Typhoon Pablo Social Media Mapping" (UN OCHA) 
This was the UN’s first crisis map that relied solely on social media data. By using the DHN, UN 
OCHA was able to reach out to two volunteer groups at once and establish the project criteria in a 
way that would be most useful to OCHA operations.2  
                                                   
1
 Patrick Meier, email correspondence with author, May 21, 2013. 
2 Ibid. 
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Figure 3 Diagram of Developing Linkages 
The diagram in Figure 3 shows the shifting linkages between the volunteer crisis mapping 
community and the ‘formal’ humanitarian sector. Using an example from each of the three 
sections above it illustrates a simplified view of the institutional arrangements between UN 
OCHA, other actors of the ‘formal’ sector (NGOs, local government), and the two publics – local 
and global (called the “internet public” because this public only refers to those connected digitally 
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to these disasters). In the first phase, there are some tenuous, informal connections between these 
two groups in the form of field surveys, which engage a selection of the local population, and 
online financial contributions, a passive means of engagement with the internet public. In the 
second phase (exemplified by the Haitian earthquake), social media and digital volunteerism has 
enabled some deeper engagement with the publics, but the use of these products by the ‘formal’ 
sector is still inconsistent and tenuous. Finally, in the third phase the intervention of the Digital 
Humanitarian Network acts as a formal link between crisis mapping volunteers and the UN. This 
relationship works in terms of requesting and receiving the data, making a formal linkage that 
goes back to include the local population creating tweets.  
These connections are still forming and strengthening, so this diagram should be seen as a three 
moments captured of a still-moving process. At this point, however, it is quite significant to note 
that formal connections have been made, giving a significance to the work of these volunteer 
crisis mappers now that their products are being formally received and used.  
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WHO ARE THE VOLUNTEERS?  
As volunteer crisis mappers become increasingly connected to the ‘formal’ humanitarian actors 
the question of their credibility as sources becomes increasingly relevant. As Flanagin and 
Metzger (2008) explain, the credibility of a source is dependent on two things: trustworthiness 
and expertise. Institutional connections to ‘formal’ actors within the field of humanitarian 
response indicates some acceptance of these volunteer crisis mappers’ credibility, and the 
institutional roles of the organizations will be explored in the next chapter, but the identity of the 
volunteers themselves is still a crucial, and currently overlooked, element to their overall 
credibility. This chapter presents results from an online survey of crisis mapping volunteers, 
conducted by the author. The survey questions focused on several areas of the volunteers’ 
background and their personal and professional experiences in an effort to determine whether 
volunteers make credible sources.  
The significant survey findings fall into three categories – the volunteers’ professional 
backgrounds, their motivations, and their geographic experience. By the nature of the fact that 
they are volunteers, volunteer crisis mappers are often assumed to be amateurs. The 
neogeography literature discussed in the second chapter raises several concerns related to 
amateur mappers. First, there is concern about the reliability of the data they produce. Then, in a 
broader sense, there is concern about amateur mappers not having professional guidelines to 
inform their behavior.  
The motivations of amateur mappers are also often suspect (Flanagin and Metzger 2008). Because 
it is so easy to make maps online, there is concern that these map makers are not interested in the 
deeper, academic side of mapping, and are instead just participants in a trend. In the case of 
volunteer crisis mappers this is even more worrisome because humanitarian crises are actual life-
or-death situations and a casual participant may not consider the ramifications of errors or low 
work standards.  
Finally, geographic experience, a term that covers both where a volunteer is from (his or her 
nationality) and where s/he has lived or traveled, is another crucial detail for such a 
simultaneously global and remotely based phenomenon. It addresses the possibility of a 
geographic bias of volunteers. Also, personal experience in a relevant country or region can 
translate to existing social networks in that region as a source for information, familiarity with 
local knowledge (ie. how an address is described), or knowledge of local languages.  
The Survey 
I administered the online survey to the crisis mapping community via several methods. I emailed 
some of my interview contacts3 the link and asked them to pass it on through their networks. One 
contact, Shoreh Elhami of GIS Corps, sent the survey link out to the entire GIS Corps listserv. At 
the suggestion of another interview subject4 I posted a link to the survey with a brief description 
of my project on the online posting sites for CrisisMappers.net and the Standby Task Force. I also 
hosted the survey on my personal MIT webpage with some background information about me 
                                                   
3
 Shoreh Elhami at GIS Corps, and two volunteer crisis mappers, Max Richman and Robert Banick. 
4 Anahi Ayala Iacucci of the Standby Task Force 
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and my thesis. However, this website was not considered a primary means of contact; rather, it 
served to give the survey some context to those finding it through a second hand relation to me. A 
copy of the survey is included in the appendix.  
In two months (January and February 2013), 81 people responded to the survey. The respondents 
are a diverse group based on age, gender, nationality and educational experience. 21 different 
nationalities are represented in the 81 responses, a full range of ages from under 22 to over 50, and 
every level of educational achievement. Respondents listed affiliation with several crisis mapping 
organizations – the GIS Corps, the Standby Task Force, Crisis Commons, Humanitarian 
OpenStreetMap – and several other NGOs or local organizations, like the Peace Corps, Statistics 
without Boarders, and HumaniNet.  
Potential Bias 
Because of the distribution methods the survey sample is skewed towards the GIS Corps and the 
Standby Task Force. Plus, perhaps because the GIS Corps members were the only group to receive 
the survey in an email from a leader of the organization, an overwhelming majority of the 
responses indicate some affiliation with the GIS Corps. Of the 81 responses, 56 (69%) indicate GIS 
Corps as the first organization they volunteer worked with, and 61 (75%) indicate at least some 
affiliation with the GIS Corps. This skew is particularly relevant for the findings related to 
volunteer professional backgrounds because the GIS Corps is an organization with strong ties to 
GIS professionals and professional associations.  
This survey was intended to be exploratory, and so the results are not supposed to be statistically 
significant. The sample size, 81, is small compared to the number of registered volunteers with 
these two groups; the GIS Corp and the Standby Task Force have roughly 3,000 and 900 members 
respectively. Although, the survey indicates that there is some overlap in membership between 
the two.  
Finally, with an anonymous survey, it is possible that responses are purposely misleading. 
However, since respondents have nothing to gain from misrepresenting themselves, this seems 
unlikely.  
Professional Background 
The Web 2.0 and neogeography literature raises concerns regarding the increasing role of 
amateur mappers creating maps online. Professional geographers are trained to uphold certain 
standards and best practices in terms of choosing data, analyzing it and displaying it. Because 
these mappers are not trained geographers, the literature agues, they are not upholding these 
standards and yet the maps they produce may not be easily distinguishable to the general public 
due to the accessibility of GeoWeb tools. Misinformation as a result of an incorrectly presented 
map is all the more concerning in the context of humanitarian operations, where the map may be 
the single piece of information on which relief administration or other dire decisions are made. 
Thus, the skills and professional background of crisis-mapping volunteers are central to 
understanding the impact they have on humanitarian operations. 
In contrast to the assumption that volunteers are predominantly amateurs, the vast majority of 
survey respondents (85%) indicated that they worked in a field related to crisis mapping. Of these 
positive responses, 87% indicated that they worked in a field related to “GIS/Mapping.” The other 
responses indicated experience in “Statistics/Data Analysis” (6%), “Humanitarian Work” (4%) and 
“International Development/Aid” (2%) (see Figure 4. Besides indicating a level of professional 
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training that is relevant to their crisis mapping work, these results also suggest that crisis mappers 
come from fields with relevant codes of conduct to guide their mapping decisions, even while 
they doing volunteer work.  
 
Figure 4 Volunteers who work in a related professional field (n=69) 
As explained earlier, because the majority of survey respondents have an affiliation with the GIS 
Corps, it is possible that the responses are biased towards a more professionalized volunteer. 
However, when the responses are separated by what kind of group the volunteer first engaged 
with (GIS Corps or other groups), in both groups the majority of responses indicate working in a 
related field, and in both groups the most popular field is “GIS/Mapping.” 
A second question on the survey asked volunteers to indicate any software or online platforms 
that they used for their crisis mapping projects. Familiarity with software was used as a second 
way to understand the scope of volunteers’ specific skills. Respondents could select as many 
options as were representative of their experience from a list that included Ushahidi Crowdmap, 
ArcMap, QGIS, Tomnod, and “Other” where they could type in other responses.  
ArcMap and QGIS, an open source version of ArcMap, are relatively specialized GIS software 
packages that require at least some understanding of geospatial datasets. The Ushahidi 
CrowdMap platform plots points of data that are collected from SMS or online reports, or entered 
into a simple database; it is simpler, designed for anyone to figure out on their own, and available 
for free on the Ushahidi website. The website promises that after downloading, the user will be 
plotting data “within minutes” (Crowdmap 2013). Tomnod is a crowdsourcing tool for analyzing 
satellite imagery that simplifies a project into microtasks that are manageable for non-experts to 
accomplish.  
87% 
6% 
4% 
2% 1% 
GIS/Mapping
Statistics/Data Analysis
Humanitarian/Human Rights
International Development/Aid
Other
Who are the Volunteers? 
 
23 
 
 
Figure 5 Tools used by volunteers for crisis mapping projects (n= 68) 
72% of respondents indicated having used ArcMap and 21% had used QGIS, while only 15% had 
used CrowdMap and none had used Tomnod (see Figure 5). So, from this list of two technically 
advanced and two generally approachable tools, it is striking that the advanced tools (ArcMap 
and QGIS) were significantly more prevalent in responses.In part, these numbers are indicative of 
the types of projects that volunteers work on – Tomnod would only be used for projects that 
needed satellite imagery analyzed, while ArcMap can be used for many crisis-mapping activities. 
However, they are also an indication of the skill level of volunteers – these volunteers either 
already knew how to use these programs or were able to learn them well enough to complete the 
necessary tasks. In either case this indicates a certain level of technical skill.  
Thus, although the survey does not find that every crisis mapping volunteer comes from a related 
profession, it is clear that a majority of the volunteers who responded are not amateur mappers.  
Motivation  
Again, by nature of the fact that they are volunteers, volunteer crisis mappers are often assumed 
to be indifferent to or unaware of the specific challenges of mapping and of humanitarian work 
(Flanagin and Metzger 2008). In humanitarian situations every decision to be made affects the 
lives of people in dire situations. When these decisions are based on information assembled by 
volunteers the main concern is whether the volunteers understand the importance of maintaining 
high standards of data collection and analysis (Chandran 2013). A volunteer’s intention for 
participating in a project can also have an impact on that volunteer’s perceived trustworthiness; 
an indifferent volunteer would be less trustworthy. So, motivation is also relevant to the issue of 
credibility via trustworthiness.  
Two survey questions aimed to see how volunteers conceived of their participation, particularly in 
light of the humanitarian context. One question asked about volunteers’ motivation as an 
indication of their intentions going into a crisis mapping situation. The second question focused 
on the personal impact of the experience to explain why volunteers continue to participate after 
their first crisis mapping experience, and what, if anything, they are learning from the experience. 
This section will discuss the findings from two questions.  
Specific Motivations 
In general, evaluations of volunteer motivations use several standard categories to explain a 
volunteer’s choice to participate – values, understanding, social, career, protective, enhancement 
– the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) developed by Clary and Snyder (2002). A previous 
study of the motivations of volunteer crisis mappers (focused solely on the Standby Task Force) 
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used these general categories and found that SBTF volunteers were primarily motivated by 
interest (in gaining and/or practicing skills, learning about technology), but altruism was also a 
strong motivator (Hitchens 2012). However, “interest” and “altruism” are broad categories. Are the 
volunteers interested in hard skills or humanitarian work? Are they motivated to help people in 
general, or is there a specific issue or place that motivates them?  
In the survey, volunteers were asked about their motivation for joining a crisis mapping project 
and were given five options from which they could select one: “interest in a specific country or 
conflict,” “interest in gaining experience in humanitarian work,” “wanted more practice with 
particular skills,” “curiosity,” and  “other” where they could write in an response. Thus, the 
“interest” category from general volunteer assessments is split into three options: general interest 
in humanitarian work, specific interest in a particular event, interest in practicing skills.   
 
Figure 6 Volunteers' motivation for joining a crisis mapping project (n=79) 
The most popular response was “interest in gaining experience in humanitarian work (37%), 
followed by “wanted more practices with particular skills” (22%) and “other” (19%) (see Figure 6). 
Most of the responses for “other” listed a variation of an interest in “helping others” (10 out of 15). 
So, there is a specific focus on humanitarian work which suggests at least an awareness of how it 
is different from other volunteering and mapping opportunities. The altruism expressed in the 
“other” category also expresses awareness that this work affects people, and is not merely an 
exercise. So, like the previous study this shows that altruism is a strong motivator for volunteers, 
but unlike the previous study, this finds that specifically interest in humanitarian work is the 
strongest driver. 
These findings are consistent with the findings in the Hitchens study of SBTF volunteers. In both 
cases “interest” is by far the most popular response. The difference is that here the split between 
skills and humanitarian work is visible.  
Personal Impact 
In terms of assessing the personal impact of their crisis-mapping experience volunteers were 
asked, “Do you feel that your involvement in crisis-mapping has had any impact on the following: 
topics/places you follow in the news, reading, etc., general interest in foreign affairs, your social 
networks, your career goals, other [write in].” Respondents could choose as many answers as they 
38% 
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19% 
14% 
6% 
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needed. 62% of respondents to this question indicated an impact in the topics and/or places they 
follow in the news. 59% indicated that their career goals were impacted. Interest in foreign affairs 
and social networks were also frequent choices (38% and 39% respectively) (see Figure 6).  
These results indicate learning beyond the hard skills used to do crisis mapping; volunteers are 
absorbing knowledge about the humanitarian issues that they are engaging with. This would 
suggest that the process is capable of making volunteers aware of the uniqueness of humanitarian 
situations.  
 
Figure 7 Volunteers' reported personal impact from crisis mapping projects (n=71) 
Thus, these results indicate that a sub-group within the volunteers is self-selected by their 
particular interest in humanitarian work. Also, a significant portion report personal impacts that 
suggest that they are absorbing information about humanitarian issues.   
Geographic Experience 
The two previous sections have presented findings that show the volunteers of crisis mapping 
projects are a self-selected group with experience in mapping and specific interest in 
humanitarian work. Finally, this section will look more carefully at where these volunteers are 
from and where they have lived. Geographic experience is relevant in terms of the local 
knowledge that volunteers bring to a crisis mapping project, and in terms of discovering any 
internal geographic bias in the population of volunteer crisis mappers.  
Because of the international nature of humanitarian crises and the remote nature of most 
volunteer crisis mapping efforts it seemed critical to investigate the geographical experiences of 
crisis mapping volunteers. Also, the global digital divide makes it more likely that such a 
technology dependent activity has greater representation in areas of the world with better access 
to such technology. This regional bias could impact how data is interpreted and represented. The 
most obvious example of this is language. Also, locations are described and defined in different 
ways in different cultural contexts, and these mismatches can affect data interpretation. However, 
volunteers who are from the global North may still have knowledge of some places in the global 
South, depending on their personal experiences, so the survey aimed to gather a comprehensive 
view of the volunteers’ geographic experience. 
Nationality 
Both the ‘formal’ humanitarian sector and the greater international development sector have a 
Northern bias in terms of the nationalities of those employed and the countries that give the most 
financial contributions. Thus, the first fact to establish is whether the volunteer crisis mapping 
The Neo-Humanitarians: Assessing the Credibility of Organized Volunteer Crisis Mappers 
26 
 
community also has a Western bias. In fact, an overwhelming majority of respondents are from 
(ie. their nationality) the global North; 84% of respondents are from countries high income 
countries in the global North5, with 54% just from the U.S. This is not a particularly surprising 
finding given that the International Conference on Crisis Mapping has been held in the U.S. or 
Europe since its creation in 20096, and that English is the dominant language of organized crisis 
mapping.  
Countries Lived In 
Still, nationality is just one measure of a person’s geographical experience; a person can hold the 
nationality of one country while living in another, thus possessing knowledge of both. So, to gain 
a more complete image of a volunteer’s geographic experience, the survey also asked respondents 
to list all the countries where they had spent time in the past five years7. 26% of respondents had 
lived or spent time in countries other than that of their origin. 85% of respondents lived in the 
same country of their nationality and 17% had lived in other countries as well as the country of 
their nationality. These findings suggest some mobility among volunteers, but a large majority 
whose geographic experience is limited to one country.  
Location of Crisis Mapping Projects 
Finally, volunteers were asked to list the locations of the crisis mapping projects in which they 
had participated. For a final comparison both lists of countries – those of nationality and 
residence – were compared to the volunteers’ responses about the location of projects. 29 (45%) 
had worked on projects in countries where they were from or had lived; 36 (56%) had worked on 
projects in places where they had no recent experience (with 6 (9%) overlapping both of these 
two categories); and 5 (8%) worked on global projects. Figure 9 shows the breakdown of volunteer 
geographic experience and corresponding crisis mapping project location. Figure 7 is a map that 
shows where volunteers are from (combining nationality and countries lived in) in blue with the 
locations of their crisis mapping projects overlaid in red. Darker colors indicate more responses 
related to that country.    
                                                   
5
 Volunteer nationalities: American, American Indian, Australian, Belgian, British, Canadian, Filipino, 
Finnish, German, Guatemalan, Guyanese, Indian, Israeli, Italian, Nigerian, Norwegian, Pakistani, 
Portuguese, Ugandan, Vietnamese. 
6 However, the 2013 ICCM conference will be held in Nairobi, certainly a sign of shifting tides.  
7
 Five years was chosen to overlap with the timeframe of crisis mapping projects, most of which began after 
2007 when the Ushahidi platform became available.  
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Figure 8 Volunteers' Geographic Experience - blue indicates either nationality or having been to a country, 
red indicates working on a crisis map in that country 
 
 
Figure 9 Overlap of volunteers' geographic experience & the location of their projects (n=64) 
Although there is not one single trend here, it is clear that a significant portion of volunteers 
choose to participate in countries where they have a personal stake or connection. The benefit of 
these volunteers is that they also may bring a kind of ‘local’ knowledge to the project (discussed at 
length below). And, given the time frame – five years – that volunteers were asked about living or 
traveling abroad, it is possible that some of the 47% who seem to have worked on projects in 
places they have not been, in fact have some experience in that location outside of the five year 
window.  
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The role of ‘local’ knowledge 
Typically, the ‘local’ knowledge comes from people who live at the site of the project and thus 
serve as a means of knowing the deeper context. However, in the case of remote crisis mapping 
projects, ‘local’ knowledge can be any better understanding of the local context – languages, slang, 
referential terms (landmarks, etc.).  
For example, consider the finding during a USAID-led crowdsourcing project that participants 
with knowledge of a place were able to help decode addresses that were described in ways that 
did not reflect the standard Western format. The project was not a crisis mapping project, but 
USAID did reach out to crisis mapping volunteer organizations, including the Standby Task Force 
and the GIS Corps, for volunteer participation. The aim of the project was to geocode a large 
dataset of locations of loan recipients in the international USAID Development Credit Authority 
project. Volunteers were each given a few addresses to work on, entering their results into an 
online form that would create a database. Volunteers were supposed to locate each address in a 
region of the country so the results could show the reach of the loan program. However, many of 
the ‘addresses’ were written in the local format and often did not include a street name, number, 
or district.  So, volunteers had to be creative problem solvers to figure out the location of these 
addresses. Some volunteers relied on their own experiences or social networks to determine the 
correct location for these addresses.8 Thus, this case proves the relevance of some form of local 
knowledge or experience on the part of the volunteer or their social networks. (The survey did not 
ask volunteers about the global reach of their social networks. Although, it seems likely that those 
with more global travel experience would have a more global social network, this could be an area 
for more research.) 
Conclusion 
For the group of volunteer crisis mappers surveyed the assumptions of the literature do not seem 
to be accurate. A great majority are GIS and mapping professionals, and they apply these skills 
while acting as a volunteer crisis mapper as evidenced by their use of advanced software. Their 
motivations are diverse, although the largest subset was specifically interested in humanitarian 
work. And the personal impacts of crisis mapping seemed to increase interest in and awareness of 
international issues. Finally, while the geographic origins of crisis mapping volunteers indeed 
shows a bias towards the global North, the volunteers show a high degree of global mobility 
which presents the possibility of local knowledge and global social networks.  
In terms of their credibility, the volunteers surveyed displayed attributes that merit trust and 
evidence expertise. Their professional skills and affiliations are a testament to the predominant 
mapping expertise that these volunteers bring to their projects. Meanwhile, their motivations 
support their trustworthiness by disproving their indifference to the issues at stake in crisis 
mapping.  
                                                   
8 Shadrock Roberts, presentation at the Wilson Center, Washington DC, July 28, 2012. 
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THE ROLE OF VOLUNTEER 
ORGANIZATIONS 
This chapter will focus on the organizations that coordinate volunteer crisis mapping projects. 
These volunteer organizations are critical in distinguishing between other amateur mapping 
projects and organized volunteer crisis mapping interventions. Unlike ad hoc responses or loose 
communities, the organizations manage volunteer recruitment and training, project selection and 
definition, and coordination with ‘formal’ humanitarian partners in the field. They also establish 
ethical codes and standards to guide the actions of the volunteers. In terms of establishing source 
credibility, the organizations make institutional connections on behalf of volunteers and vouch 
for their experience.  
Just like the volunteers, crisis mapping organizations are not a homogenous group. The 
distinction can be seen in the way they conceptualize their role as an organization and the role of 
their volunteers. One type of organization emulates a professional, technically focused 
environment, treating volunteers like hired professional. The other type of organization is 
transparent, flexible and focused on humanitarianism. It aims to train anyone to be a remote 
humanitarian.  
This chapter will look at two organizations, the Standby Task Force and the GIS Corps, as 
representative case studies of these two types of volunteer crisis mapping organizations. First 
each organization will be introduced with a brief description of the organization’s origins and its 
organizational structure. Then, the role of the volunteer, code of conduct and institutional 
connections will be explored to draw out the particularities of each type of organization. Finally, a 
comparative analysis of the two types will explain how each establishes the credibility of their 
volunteers.    
Methodology 
Research on volunteer crisis mapping organizations took two forms – semi-structured interviews 
with key players in volunteer crisis mapping, and textual analysis of online content, particularly 
for the two case organizations, the GIS Corps and the Standby Task Force. Interview subjects were 
chosen through a snow-balling technique, where one interviewee would recommend other key 
players. Some subjects were individually targeted because of their role in a particular 
organization. Initial interviews were held with contacts from my personal network after working 
in a related field for the summer. 9 These initial interviewees included two remote-sensing 
professionals from the human rights and humanitarian fields, and two former crisis mapping 
volunteers who had since entered the humanitarian field professionally. The initial interviews 
were also useful in defining the field and its major actors. Some volunteer organizations were 
mentioned in these early interviews, but it was not until the International Conference on Crisis 
Mapping (ICCM) 2013 that the landscape of volunteer organizations became apparent. At this 
conference I met several leaders in the field of volunteer crisis mapping, and from this initial 
contact was able to schedule a more formal interview. The two organizations that became cases 
                                                   
9
 I worked as a summer intern at the American Association for the Advancement of Science on the 
Geospatial Technologies for Human Rights project.  
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were chosen in part because they were the two volunteer organizations represented by my 
interview subjects. I chose to use both organizations because a comparison between the two 
highlighted differences that seem consistent across the broader landscape of volunteer crisis 
mapping organizations.    
It should be noted that the nature of the volunteer crisis mapping community encourages 
openness, and consequently a remarkable amount of information is available online on the 
organizations’ websites, and through the personal blogs of key participants.10 The online resources 
included most of the practical documentation for past crisis mapping events, including training 
materials and sometimes the actual materials used to complete tasks. This high level of 
transparency makes it possible to learn a lot about the operations and past experiences of an 
organization. The information presented on these websites can also be considered a form of 
marketing material that show how the organization conceives of itself and wants to be 
represented to the outside world, and it was also analyzed as thus.  
Potential Biases 
These organizations seem to be two of the leading volunteer crisis mapping organizations in the 
U.S., but this impression could be biased by my exposure to them. There is also a U.S.-centric bias 
to my research based on the fact that I am researching primarily in English (some French) and my 
interactions with the volunteer crisis mapping community – from the conference to working with 
members of it – have all taken place in the U.S.   
The Professional Volunteer Organization: The GIS Corps 
The GIS Corps is functions like a volunteer technical community whose volunteers perform crisis 
mapping projects as well as other forms of technical assistance. It is affiliated with the Urban and 
Regional Information Systems Association (URISA), the main professional association of GIS 
professionals in the U.S. It represents the professionally-oriented type of volunteer crisis mapping 
organization. 
Background & Organizational Structure 
The GIS Corps predates most other crisis-mapping efforts. Shoreh Elhami, the founder, 
remembers first having the idea around the year 2000. As a full time GIS professional working in 
county government, she envisioned a space for GIS professionals to use their skills in ways that 
would “expand” their applications and answer needs of disadvantaged organizations and 
communities that needed such expertise for a short-term project.11 After discussing the idea with 
several colleagues, she formally presented the idea to the board of URISA in October 2003. URISA 
agreed to take on the GIS Corps as one of their projects, and the first project took place in April 
2004.  
Today, the GIS Corps has almost 3,000 registered volunteers. They have activated over 400 of 
these volunteers to participate in 111 projects in 46 countries. Some of these projects were done 
remotely, while others involved sending the ‘expert volunteers’ into the field. Not all of the 
projects involved a crisis or humanitarian situations, but all partner organizations (the 
organization contracting the volunteers) represent “underserved communities worldwide” 
                                                   
10 Personal blogs include those of Patrick Meier, of the Standby Task Force, formerly Ushahidi and the 
Digital Humanitarian Network, Anahi Ayala Iaccui, and Helena Puig, both of  SBTF. 
11 Shoreh Elhami, interview with author, December 10, 2012. 
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(Organizing Prinicples and Policies 2009). Volunteer tasks include building databases, performing 
spatial analysis, modeling, capacity building or teaching in related fields, app development and 
project evaluation.  
GIS Corps is run by a board of seven GIS professionals, each with over 20 years of experience. 
Board members are responsible for building relationships with partner organizations, recruiting 
volunteers, and evaluating volunteer applicants for specific projects. The organization is run on a 
minimal budget; neither board members nor volunteers receive payment for their time. Partner 
organizations are responsible for covering any financial costs if volunteers do work in the field. In 
the early years of GIS Corps most projects took place in the field. However, in recent years remote 
volunteering has increased. Today, Elhami estimates that 4 out of 5 projects are remote. 12 
Volunteer Management 
The professional attitude of the organization is apparent in the ways in which volunteer are 
recruited and assigned to projects. Volunteer recruitment in the early years of GIS Corps centered 
on the two major annual GIS-focused conferences in the U.S. – the ESRI conference (which draws 
over 15,000 people) and the URSIA conference (which draws about 500 people). GIS professionals 
could learn about the activities of the GIS Corps at their booths at both events. Media coverage of 
GIS Corps involvement in certain major events, like Hurricane Katrina, has also spurred volunteer 
signup.  
Volunteers are managed like short-term consultants. New volunteers register on the GIS Corps 
website, where their interests and skills are logged into a database. From this database board 
members monitor volunteers and their participation in projects. When there is a new project, the 
board sends out an email with the job requirements to the volunteers. Sometimes, when the job 
requires a very specialized set of skills (like remote sensing analysis) the board will only send the 
description to the subset of volunteers who list those skills. Interested volunteers reply with their 
interest and are evaluated on the basis of their CV, references and an interview with a board 
member. When a project requires multiple volunteers, one is selected as the team leader.13 Thus, 
the process of assigning volunteers to a project is quite similar to a professional hiring process.  
After the deployment volunteers and partner organization fill out feedback surveys. The GIS 
Corps board uses these surveys to monitor consistency and level of service as well as volunteer 
and partner satisfaction. Volunteer satisfaction is critical to the maintenance of a successful 
volunteer organization, and so GIS Corps does as much as possible, given the small budget, to 
acknowledge volunteers.  Volunteers receive certificates or letters of appreciation, and are 
encouraged to post their photos and blogs on the GIS Corps website. Also, because there are so 
many registered volunteers, preference in allocating projects is given to volunteers who have not 
previously participated in a project.14 
Institutional Connections 
The GIS Corps’ initial institutional connections were focused on the geospatial data communities, 
as evidenced by their association with URISA. However, after sending some volunteers to work on 
the reconstruction in Indonesia after the 2005 tsunami, the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre 
                                                   
12 Shoreh Elhami.  
13
 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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reached out to GIS Corps for technical assistance. This was a turning point in terms of getting 
recognition and building relationships with major humanitarian institutions.15 The same year, GIS 
Corps deployed 30 volunteers to help with the response to Hurricane Katrina. Such a large and 
technical force of volunteers on the ground got a lot of attention from the media, providing a new 
source of volunteer recruitment for the GIS Corps. Since these two pivotal projects, the GIS Corps 
has worked with multiple UN bodies, NGOs such as the Red Cross and the Information 
Management & Mine Action Programme (iMMAP), and other volunteer crisis mapping 
organizations like CrisisCommons and HumaniNet (Our Projects 2013).   
Code of Conduct 
Following in its overarching conception as a professional volunteer organization, the GIS Corps 
Code of Ethics heavily draws from relevant professional codes of conduct for geospatial and data 
management professions. It focuses on good practices for data scientists. There is no mention of 
the humanitarian context.  
Thus, it is clear that the GIS Corps is primarily a volunteer technical community that sometimes 
participates in crisis mapping activities. From the Code of Ethics to the volunteer assignment 
policies, the GIS Corps focuses its operations on assuring high quality data and mapping skills. 
Projects in humanitarian contexts are treated no differently.  
The Volunteer Humanitarian Organization: The Standby Task Force 
The Standby Task Force (SBTF) was founded in 2010 by several veteran crisis mapping volunteers 
who wanted to create a framework for managing volunteer crisis mapping efforts and a 
maintained network of volunteers so they did not have to start from scratch at every crisis.16 The 
organization is primarily inclusive – anyone can sign up to be a volunteer, and anyone can join a 
project – and explicitly focused on aiding humanitarian activities.  
Background & Organizational Structure 
After leading two consecutive volunteer crisis mapping efforts in Haiti (earthquake) and Chile 
(earthquake), and participating in a third in Pakistan (floods) in 2010, Patrick Meier realized that 
there was enough sustained interest in crisis mapping to create a more permanent online 
community of willing volunteers (Meier 2011). So, he founded the Standby Task Force with several 
other experienced crisis mappers, and launched it at the 2010 International Conference of Crisis 
Mappers. The first partner organization was UN OCHA, which had seen the successful use of the 
Ushahidi platform in all three previous cases (Haiti, Chile and Pakistan) and wanted the SBTF to 
participate in a training simulation for OCHA staff members. After a little more than two years 
the SBTF has over 900 volunteers registered.  
The organizational model is intentionally open-source and transparent, with all materials 
available online, and all spaces open to any registered volunteer (Our Model n.d.). The Core 
Team, a group of lead volunteers, is responsible for choosing projects, managing partner 
organizations, and monitoring volunteers. Four of the original founders17 serve on an advisory 
board that provides guidance to the Core Team and builds institutional partnerships.  
                                                   
15 Ibid. 
16
 Anahi Ayala Iacucci, interview with author, December 7, 2012. 
17 Patrick Meier, Anahi Ayala Iacucci, Helena Puig Larrauri, and Jaroslav Valuch 
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Task force teams organize the workflow on a specific project with one or more coordinator 
stepping in to run a team for a project. There are ten task force teams, although not every project 
requires every team: the geo-location team, the humanitarian team, the report team, the media 
monitoring team, the SMS team, the task team, the tech team, the translation team, the 
verification team, and the analysis team. Workflow between task forces, and between the SBTF 
Core Team and on the ground partners is constantly being adjusted based on feedback and 
experience. Partner organizations are responsible for evaluating the volunteers’ contributions at 
the end of a project.  
Volunteer Management 
The SBTF focuses on providing the structure for volunteers to engage in humanitarian events in a 
productive manner. Although there is some oversight and the board retains the ability to kick 
people out, in general volunteers are left to assess their own skills and do trainings independently 
(with SBTF materials) if they are interested.  
Anyone, regardless of skill level, can sign up to be a volunteer and thus receive all the “activation” 
emails (the emails that announce new projects). Volunteers register on the website, filling out 
their skills and interests. When there is a new project all volunteers receive an email with a 
description of the project, the necessary tasks (broken into task teams) and the time frame. 
Interested volunteers simply fill out an online form and show up for skype meetings. Training 
materials are available on a YouTube channel and as downloadable power points. Sometimes task 
team leaders will lead specific trainings (remotely), in particular for new volunteers.  
The SBTF does not control who participates in what project, so there are some volunteers who 
come back often and do a lot, but there are also some who do minimal work and may just join for 
the community or out of curiosity (to see how it works). Instead of worrying about how to cull 
these minimal contributors and create a force of highly committed and experienced volunteers, 
Patrick Meier, one of the SBTF directors, is interested in how to take advantage of even the 
shortest, most fleeting attention spans of volunteers by breaking down tasks as much as possible 
(“microtasking”).18  
Institutional Connections 
UN OCHA saw the power of volunteer crisis mappers during the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, so they 
were the first to reach out to the newly formed SBTF. The first project was a simulation training 
using data from an earthquake in Colombia. Since then, SBTF volunteers have participated in 
several projects with OCHA. The SBTF has worked with other actors including USAID and the 
World Health Organization (WHO).  
The personal networks of the founders also help build linkages. For example, Patrick Meier is 
professionally connected with Ushahidi, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (which he helped 
found) and the Qatar Foundation’s Computing Research Institute (QFCRI). The results of these 
connections are visible in SBTF collaborations with these other actors – such as the use of the 
QFCRI computing abilities to do the first run of data cleaning for the SBTF Typhoon Bopha 
mission (Meier 2012).  
                                                   
18 Patrick Meier.  
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Code of Conduct 
Every volunteer must sign the Standby Task Force Code of Conduct. It is based on humanitarian 
principles and draws from multiple humanitarian organizations’ guidelines, including those of the 
Red Cross and the UN. In addition to these concepts like neutrality and humanity, the SBTF Code 
addresses some specific applications given the work being done by volunteers. For example, it 
emphasizes the importance of empowering local actors and involving them whenever possible. 
Beyond the principle of “do no harm” principle, it elaborates that volunteers should not do 
anything that could potentially endanger people. This aim is echoed in a section on data quality 
that includes the warning against inciting panic, presumably with misrepresented or incorrect 
data.  
The Standby Task Force illustrates the second type of volunteer crisis mapping organization that 
focuses on the humanitarian aspect of volunteering. It strives to be open to volunteers of any level 
of technical ability by offering training opportunities and tasks at many different skill levels.  
Comparative Analysis 
These two types of volunteer crisis mapping organizations establish their credibility as 
organizations differently. The differences perceived in the way they conceptualize the role of their 
volunteers and the organization’s role in shaping the volunteers ultimately speak to two different 
foundations for credibility. The Standby Task Force emphasizes the humanitarian aspects of the 
work their volunteers do, and builds on the institutional connections made through projects and 
key individuals, like Patrick Meier. Their transparency also acts as a means of establishing 
credibility because it makes all of their methods – from volunteer training to final products – 
open and available for scrutiny. Meanwhile, the GIS Corps focuses on the professional credentials 
of both itself as an organization with strong ties to the GIS professional world, and of the 
volunteers who are treated like professionals even though they are volunteers.   
Significantly, both groups have successfully made contacts and built working relationships with 
actors in the ‘formal’ humanitarian sector, like UN OCHA. Both are also members of the Digital 
Humanitarian Network. So, despite their organizational and conceptual differences, these 
organizations share the same space institutionally as organized representatives of volunteer crisis 
mappers.  
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CONCLUSION 
As volunteer crisis mappers are being incorporated in the ‘formal’ work flow of humanitarian 
actors their work carries more weight in the decision making of humanitarian actors, and so, their 
credibility within the ‘formal’ humanitarian sector is of critical importance. The fact that they are 
being incorporated into work flows of ‘formal’ actors is an indication that they already have some 
credibility. Nevertheless, this paper set out to examine their credibility on the scale of the 
volunteers and the organizations.  
Volunteer mappers are questioned in the related Web 2.0 and neogeography literature for being 
amateurs that do not have the training and expertise of professional mappers. Both their ability to 
produce high quality data and their motivations are questioned. However, the survey results 
indicate that these crisis mapping volunteers do have relevant skills. They also have diverse 
geographical experience which can translate into local knowledge or more geographically diverse 
social networks – which can be an asset for crisis mapping work. Some volunteers have a distinct 
interest in humanitarian work and many record personal benefits (as opposed to professional) 
from participating in such work.  
The volunteer organizations play an interesting role because they control volunteer activities (by 
training and deploying volunteers) and they build institutional relationships with other actors in 
the humanitarian field. Yet, volunteer crisis mapping organizations do not see themselves in the 
same way. Some, like the GIS Corps, still act as technical consultants and do not distinguish 
humanitarian response work from other volunteer technical assistance. They manage volunteers 
in ways very similar to a professional environment and guide their behavior with similar codes of 
conduct. Other volunteer organizations, like the Standby Task Force, focus on their role as 
humanitarians. This makes their mission and code of conduct more compatible with actors in the 
‘formal’ humanitarian sector. However, their project assignment model seeks to be inclusive 
rather than professional, raising questions about volunteer preparedness and accountability. They 
do not screen volunteer by their skills, instead assuming that they will do what they are capable of 
doing.   
Future Areas of Research 
For such a nascent field there is a lot that remains to be studied. The author found only one in 
depth evaluation of a volunteer crisis mapping project – an evaluation of the Ushahidi Haiti 
project (Morrow, et al. 2011). Now that the relationships with the ‘formal’ humanitarian actors has 
changed so significantly to be much more inclusive of these volunteer efforts, it would be very 
informative to do a similar study that looked at the impact of the data collected in a volunteer 
crisis mapping project and how it was used in humanitarian decision making.   
The volunteers and their organizations are both in the process of evolving as they grown and 
build stronger linkages with the ‘formal’ humanitarian sector. It would be interesting, for 
example, to look at the evaluation of the two different types of volunteer organizations over the 
coming years. Perhaps, the differences identified in this paper will fade away as the two types of 
organizations bend to fulfill the needs of the same industry – the ‘formal’ humanitarian sector. 
Similarly, it is possible that the volunteers themselves will change as they participate in these 
crisis mapping projects. 
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Figure 10 Volunteer Crisis Mappers Survey 
